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SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

Securities Regulation-Limiting Private Rights of Action
Under the Antifraud Provisions of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934
From the enactment of the Securities Exchange Act (Exchange Act)' in

1934 through 1972, United States Supreme Court opinions enabled and
encouraged the expansion of implied private rights of action under the antifraud provisions of the Act.2 The Court's infrequent reviews of lower court
decisions 3 were pro-plaintiff, geared toward vigorous enforcement of the
Act 4 and the accomplishment of its "broad remedial purposes." 5 Since
1972, however, Supreme Court opinions in securities fraud cases have
shifted dramatically. These more recent opinions have been pro-defendant
and have had the effect of restricting the scope of permissible litigation
under the antifraud provisions of the securities laws. 6 As a result, many
1. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881, as amended by Act of June 29,
1968 (Williams Act), Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified as additionally amended at 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 78a-78u (West 1971 & Cum. Supp. 1977)).
2. The antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act are: id. § 9(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
78i(a) (1970)) (manipulation of security prices); id. § 10(b) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970))
(fraud in the purchase or sale of securities); id. § 14(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970))
(fraud in proxy solicitation); Act of June 29, 1968 (Williams Act), Pub. L. No. 90-439, § 14e, 82
Stat. 454 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970)) (fraud in tender offers).
3. Between the passage of the Securities Exchange Act in 1934 and 1972, the Court
issued six decisions interpreting antifraud provisions of the Act. In chronological order the
decisions were: J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (merger effected through circulation
of false and misleading proxy statement; implied private right of action exists under § 14(a) of
the Exchange Act as to both derivative and direct causes); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332
(1967) (withdrawable savings shares in savings and loan association are securities within the
meaning of the Exchange Act; investors who purchase shares in reliance upon misleading
advertisements are entitled to protection under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act); SEC v. National
Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969) (purchase or sale requirement of § 10(b) of the Exchange Act
does not prevent Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) injunctive action against accomplishment of merger through misleading statements); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S.
375 (1970) (stockholders can prove that merger was accomplished through proxy statement that
failed to disclose material information by showing that statement is an essential link in transaction); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971) (implied private
right of action under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act in favor of insurance company, represented
by New York Commissioner of Insurance on behalf of creditors, when individual defrauded
company by purchasing all of its shares through use of reserve fund); Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (plaintiffs allowed to recover from bank employees who
persuaded them to cash in their stock in the Ute Development Corporation without disclosing
non-Indian resale market at higher price even though plaintiffs did not prove reliance).
4. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433-34 (1964).
5. Id. at 431.
6. From 1972 until the end of the 1976 October Term, the Supreme Court decided six
cases interpreting antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act. In chronological order the decisions were: Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (plaintiffs who did not
purchase shares that defendant was required to offer them as result of antitrust consent decree
because of overly pessimistic statement accompanying offering did not have standing to sue
under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975)
(plaintiffs not entitled to injunctive relief against successful take-over bidder who had failed to
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investors who suffer injury because of manipulative securities transactions
are now prevented from seeking relief in federal courts. 7 This result is

illustrated in Crane Co. v. American Standard,Inc. (Crane HI), a case in
which a federal district court took note of the recent decisions and held that a
defeated tender offeror had no right of relief against a company that defeated
its offer by fraudulent practices that violated the Exchange Act. The inabili-

ty of the court to reach the issues of fraud presented in Crane raises
disturbing questions about the future of federal securities fraud litigation.
The Crane suit arose out of a battle for control of Westinghouse Air

Brake, Incorporated. In the summer of 1967 representatives of Crane approached Air Brake management about a possible merger of the two

companies and simultaneously began purchasing Air Brake shares on the
open market. 9 In November Air Brake informed Crane that it was not
interested in a merger; Crane responded by increasing its purchases of Air
Brake stock. Late in December Blyth and Company, investment bankers

and representatives of American Standard, Incorporated, Crane's largest
competitor in the plumbing industry, informed Air Brake that Standard
would be interested in helping Air Brake resist Crane's incipient take-over
bid. 10 Shortly thereafter, the directors of Air Brake approved a plan to merge
into Standard. I Under the proposed terms of merger, Air Brake stock, then
quoted at $36, would be exchanged for Standard convertible preferred stock
disclose its purpose as required by § 13(d) of the Exchange Act; plaintiff did not show
irreparable harm and there was an adequate remedy at law); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185 (1976) (defendant auditor not liable to purchaser as aider and abettor for failure to
discover client's fraudulent securities sales scheme because there was no allegation of scienter); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (plaintiff could not recover under
§ 14(a) of the Exchange Act based on allegations that defendants had accomplished a merger
through a misleading proxy statement because plaintiff had not shown substantial likelihood
that omitted fact would have had actual significance in deliberations of reasonable shareholder); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (tender offeror whose offer was
defeated by practices that violated the Exchange Act has no standing to sue for damages under
§ 14(e) of the Williams Act); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (minority shareholders of company merged into defendant under Delaware short-form procedure cannot recover on
grounds of unfairness and lack of notice because § 10(b) of the Exchange Act is not concerned
with fairness and the disclosure requirements are controlled by state law).
7. See generally Aranow, Einhorn & Berlstein, Standing to Sue to Challenge Violations
of the Williams Act, 32 Bus. LAw. 1755 (1977); Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions
Under the FederalSecurities Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEo. L.J. 891 (1977).
8. 439 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) [hereinafter cited as CraneIII].
9. Id. at 946-47.
10. Id.
11. On February 20, 1968, Crane filed schedule 14-B, a form required by SEC rule 14a1(c), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-I l(c) (1977), as a prerequisite to soliciting proxies for the election of
a corporation's board of directors. The Air Brake directors immediately met to discuss Blyth's
February 19, 1968, proposal to merge Air Brake into Standard. On March 4 the directors met in
formal session and voted for the merger. On March 5 Air Brake informed its shareholders of the
action taken by the directors and of the terms of the merger agreement. Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 791 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Crane1].
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The controversial phase of the take-over contest began on April 8,
when Crane mailed to Air Brake shareholders an offer to exchange Air
Brake stock for Crane subordinated debentures worth approximately $50.
During the same week, Air Brake mailed its proxy statement soliciting
proxies in favor of the proposed Standard merger. 1" On April 19, the day
Crane's offer was to expire, Standard purchased 82,400 shares on the
market for cash at an average price of $49.08, while it engaged in undisclosed private sales of 100,000 shares to a friendly investment company at
441/2 and 20,000 shares to a friendly investment banking house at 447/8.14 This
maneuver precluded any hope of success for Crane's initial offer. 15 Although Crane finally managed to obtain 32% of the shares of Air Brake, the
proxy count at the May 16 meeting of Air Brake shareholders ran heavily in
favor of the Standard merger; 16 consequently, on June 7 that merger was
consummated. Crane's stock interest in Air Brake was converted into
Standard shares by the merger. On June 13, under threat of a divestiture
12. Crane I, 419 F.2d 787, 791 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970).

13. Id.
14. Crane III, 439 F. Supp. at 947. The last day of a tender offer is often the most
important because of the activity of professional risk arbitrageurs, a small group of individuals

associated with member firms of the New York Stock Exchange. Professional arbitrageurs
make large open-market purchases of the target company's shares somewhere between the
market price and the tender offer price for the purpose of subsequently tendering their shares at
a profit. The arbitrageurs usually wait until the last possible moment before deciding whether to
tender their shares. See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL
173-91 (1973). On April 19 arbitrageurs saw the tape price of Air Brake rise five points. This
sudden rise would cause the arbitrageurs not to tender their shares if they believed they could
sell on the market at 50 or above or if they believed that the rise in price would result in the
defeat of the tender offer and the consequent risk that shares tendered would be returned and
the market price would fall. The arbitrageurs could not accurately assess the market for Air
Brake shares because they and other investors were unaware that the sudden demand for Air
Brake shares was artificially created by Standard (of the 26,300 shares traded at 50 that day, all
but 100 were bought by Standard, Crane I, 419 F.2d 787, 893 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 822 (1970)), and they were unaware of Standard's two private sales of 120,000 shares
(Standard's telegram to one of its private purchasers confirming the sale was marked "HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL," id.). These private sales were made at approximately the same price
that Air Brake opened at on April 19 and were indicative of the true market demand for Air
Brake shares. Id. If Air Brake shares had remained at 45 throughout the day the arbitrageurs
would likely have tendered to realize their profit on the offer as the price spread would make it
probable that ordinary shareholders would tender, the offer would be a success, and the risk of
nonacceptance would be low.
In the early proceedings in Crane the number of Air Brake shares purchased by Standard
was erroneously reported to have been 170,200. At the 1976 trial it was brought to the court's
attention that the correct figure was 82,400. Crane III, 439 F. Supp. at 947 n.l.
15. Having fallen short of control, Crane extended its offer past April 19. Even with this
extension, however, it was not able to secure the necessary number of shares. Crane I, 419 F.2d
787, 791 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970).
16. The proxy count was 2,903,869 for the merger and 1,180,298 against. Almost all of the
proxies against the merger were voted by Crane. Id.
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action to be brought by Standard under the antitrust laws, Crane sold all but
17
10,000 of its shares of Standard, earning a substantial profit.

In the midst of the take-over contest Crane filed two suits against its
opponents in federal district court. The first, against Air Brake, alleged
misrepresentation in the Air Brake proxy statement and requested an injunc-

tion against continued solicitation and use of the proxies.1 8 The second suit,
naming Standard and Blyth as defendants, attacked Standard's April 19
transactions in stock as illegal purchases of proxies and as "market manipu19
lation" and "fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of securities."
17. Crane earned a profit of "several million dollars" and later disposed of all but 1000 of
the remaining shares. Id.
Shortly after Crane sold its stock, Standard and several Standard shareholders filed suit
against Crane alleging that Crane's sale of Standard shares within six months of its purchase of
Air Brake shares was a violation of § 16(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970)
(regulating short swing profits on insider trading). Crane entered a counterclaim for damages it
had sustained by virtue of Standard's allegedly fraudulent action opposing its tender offer. In
American Standard, Inc. v. Crane Co., 346 F. Supp. 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), the judge granted
Standard's motion for summary judgment and denied Crane's. On appeal, 510 F.2d 1043 (2d
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1000 (1975), the court of appeals reversed. Following the
rationale of Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973), the court held that
§ 16(b) liability should not be imposed on Crane for its sale because plaintiffs had failed to show
that there was any likelihood that Crane, as a 10% shareholder, had access to or had abused
inside information. 510 F.2d at 1053-56. After the court of appeals decision Crane dropped its
counterclaim and proceeded to pursue its damages in Crane III, 439 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
18. Crane Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 490 F.2d 332, 335 (2d Cir. 1973) [hereinafter
cited as Crane II]. This suit was filed April 17, 1968.
19. Crane I, 419 F.2d 787, 791-92 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970). Illegal
purchases of proxies are a violation of § 14(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 378n(a) (1970);
"market manipulation" is a violation of § 9(a)(2), id. § 78i(a)(2), and "fraud in connection with
the purchase or sale of securities" is a violation of § 10(b), id. § 78j(b), and SEC rule 10b-5, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977).
Section 9(a)(2) makes it unlawful:
To effect, alone or with one or more other persons, a series of transactions in any
security registered on a national securities exchange creating actual or apparent active
trading in such security or raising or depressing the price of such security, for the
purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security by others.
15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (1970). Liability for a violation of § 9(a)(2) is provided by § 9(e):
Any person who willfully participates in any act or transaction in violation of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section, shall be liable to any person who shall purchase or
sell any security at a price which was affected by such act or transaction, and the
person so injured may sue in law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction to
recover the damages sustained as a result of any such act or transaction.
Id. § 78i(e). Section 10(b) reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
Id. § 78j(b). Rule 1Ob-5, adopted by the SEC pursuant to § 10(b), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
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Crane prayed for an injunction against Standard voting its Air Brake stock,
consummating the merger or performing any further acts that violated the
Exchange Act 2° and also for "such other and further relief as may be just
and proper." ' 21 The two suits were consolidated for trial and on June 5,
1968, the district judge entered an order dismissing the consolidated complaint on the merits. 22 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co. (CraneI)23 affirmed
the dismissal except as to the claims against Standard for its April 19 stock
transactions. On remand to the district court for a determination of appropriate relief, the proceedings were stultified by an order granting Standard's
motion to have all issues relitigated before a jury.24 At Crane's request the
order was certified for appeal, 25 and in 1973 the case returned to the court of
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977).
20. Crane III, 439 F. Supp. at 947.
21. Id.
22. Crane II, 490 F.2d 332, 335 (2d Cir. 1969).
23. 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970). The court held that the
April 19 transactions violated §§ 9(a)(2) and 10(b) of the Exchange Act and rule lOb-5, see note
19 supra, and that Crane was entitled to such relief as in equity might be required for the injury
it suffered as a result of these transactions. 419 F.2d at 792, 804. The court rejected Standard's
defense that it had acted in good faith simply to increase its voting position in Air Brake while
keeping its holdings of Air Brake stock below 10% in order to avoid problems under § 16(b) of
the Exchange Act. Id. at 792. Section 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970), allows the issuer to
recover any profits made on "any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase of any equity
security of such issuer. . . within any period of less than 6 months" by corporate insiders. Id.
24. The proceedings on remand are described in Crane II, 490 F.2d 332, 337-39 (2d Cir.
1969). One district court order on remand was reported in Crane Co. v. American Standard,
Inc., 326 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). On remand Crane disclosed the following claims for
monetary relief:
(1)the difference in value between Crane's 32% block of Air Brake Stock, including
the value of control, and the Standard shares which were received in exchange
therefor after the merger of Air Brake into Standard, (2) similar damages with respect
to Air Brake stock which Crane was prevented from acquiring as a result of Standard's
alleged manipulation and deceit, (3) the value to Crane of control of Air Brake, (4) the
loss which Crane allegedly suffered from the forced sale of its Air Brake stock, for
antitrust reasons, subsequent to the merger, and (5) punitive damages.
Crane II, 490 F.2d at 337 n.6. These claims led Standard to move for an order "defining and
limiting the issues." The court granted this "to the extent of striking as a nonjury issue the
assessment of any money damages other than such amounts as may be required to render
equitable relief effective." 326 F. Supp. at 776-77. In addition, the order stated that if Crane
decided to formally amend its complaint to include the claims, Standard would be entitled to a
jury trial. This order was reaffirmed by another order issued July 6, 1973. The latter order
became the subject of a new appeal to the Second Circuit. 490 F.2d at 334-35.
25. Crane II, 490 F.2d 332, 334-35 (2d Cir. 1969).
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appeals as Crane Co. v. American Standard,Inc. (Crane1I).26 The appellate court ruled that the district court's order was erroneous and remanded,
27
directing the district court "to get on with the task" of determining relief.
28 held a hearing
On remand, the district court (Crane Mfl)
on the issue of

relief. After this hearing, but before the court had rendered its opinion, the
Supreme Court decided Piper v. Chris-CraftIndustries,Inc. ,29 which held
that a defeated tender offeror had no private right of action under section
14(e) of the Exchange Act or SEC rule lOb-6. 30 In September 1977 the
district court, taking note of Chris-Craft and other recent Supreme Court
32
opinions,3 1 held that Crane was entitled to no relief.

The history of the availability of relief to tender offerors under the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act is essentially the history of the Crane
case. Crane I established the right of a tender offeror to claim relief under
these provisions. It was hailed as a landmark decision 33 and was instrumen26. 490 F.2d 332 (2d Cir. 1973).
27. Id. at 345.
28. Crane III, 439 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
29. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
30. Chris Craft involved the question whether a tender offeror suing in its capacity as a
take-over bidder had standing to sue for damages under § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970)
(making fraud in connection with a tender offer unlawful), or rule lOb-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-6
(1977) (making purchases of securities outside the tender offer by the offeror unlawful). ChrisCraft sought to gain control over Piper. Piper decided to fight the attempt with the assistance of
Bangor Punta and First Boston Corporation. Chris-Craft made a tender offer and Bangor Punta
countered with its own offer. In the course of the competition Chris-Craft filed suit alleging that
Piper had made misleading statements to Piper shareholders in opposition to the tender offer,
that Bangor Punta had made material omissions in its tender offer statement filed with the SEC,
that First Boston was liable for certifying the statement (all this in violation of § 14(e)) and that
Bangor Punta had purchased 120,000 shares in a private sale during the pendency of its tender
offer in violation of rule lOb-6 and proposed rule lOb-13, 17 C.F.R. § 240. 1Ob-13 (1977) (adopted
Nov. 10, 1969). The Supreme Court held that the legislative history of the Act of June 29, 1968
(Williams Act), Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 781,
78m, 78n (West 1971 & Cum. Supp. 1977)), which amended the Exchange Act by adding § 14(e),
showed that Congress passed the Act solely for the purpose of protecting public investors who
are confronted with a tender offer, 430 U.S. at 35, and that a private right of action could be
implied only in favor of" 'the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted.' " Id. at
37 (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)). The Court's argument denying Chris-Craft relief
under rule lOb-6 emphasized that Chris-Craft came before the Court not as an ordinary
shareholder but as a defeated tender offeror and as such its claim stood outside the express
concern of the rule. Id. at 45. Chris-Craftis reviewed in Aranow, Einhorn & Berlstein, supra
note 7; 1976-77 Securities Laws Developments, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 861, 950-53, 960-63
(1977).
31. Crane III, 439 F. Supp. at 954. For cases noticed by the district court, see note 51
infra.
32. 439 F. Supp. at 958.
33. The following statement is representative:
Craneexpands the anti-fraud provisions to an additional class of plaintiffs-those who
are not purchasers or sellers directly engaged in a securities transaction. The effect is
not to decrease the burden of proof required to establish a violation of rule lOb-5. but
rather to toll the death knell of the Birnbaum [v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952); see text accompanying notes 35 & 36 infra]
doctrine.
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tal in setting the pattern of litigation between tender offer contestants that
existed until the Supreme Court decided Chris-Craft.34 The court of appeals' flexible interpretation of the Exchange Act enabled Crane to overcome difficult problems of establishing standing and claim relief as a victim
of securities fraud. This flexibility was clearly illustrated by the manner in
which the court dealt with the issue of standing-the most serious threshold
obstacle to Crane's suit.
Crane's first cause of action was based on rule lOb-5. At the time of
Crane I standing under rule lOb-5 was controlled by the rule of Birnbaum v.
Newport Steel Corp.,35 requiring that one be an actual purchaser or seller in
the securities transaction affected by the wrongdoer to claim relief from the
wrongdoer. 36 In the Crane I court's view the Birnbaum rule, which it
implied had originally been concerned with establishing a causal link between the fraud perpetrated and the injury suffered, 37 was satisfied when
38
a nonpurchaser or seller, otherwise entitled to the Act's protection,
Note, SecuritiesExchangeAct of 1934-AntifraudProvisionsApplied to Tender Offers Affected
by Manipulative Practices and Nondisclosures, 45 TUL. L. REV. 188, 195 (1970); see, e.g.,
Recent Cases, Securities Regulation-Standing- Defrauded Tender-Offeror May Sue Under
Rule l0b-5 When Made a "Forced Seller" Under Threat of Antitrust Action, 23 VAND. L. REV.
885 (1970); Recent Developments, Securities Regulation-Tender Offers--Standing to SuePurchaser-SellerRequirement, Corporation Making a Tender Offer Has Standing Under the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 to Seek Damages and Injunctive ReliefAgainst Anyone
Unlawfully OpposingIts Offer Despite the Fact that it Was Not Deceived in Its Own Purchases,
15 VILL. L. REV. 1002 (1970).
34. CraneI was the first case to grant a tender offeror standing to sue under the antifraud
provisions of the Exchange Act. Crane was granted standing to sue under rule lOb-5 because it
was forced to sell its shares after losing the take-over contest. See note 44 and accompanying
text infra. The decision to break new ground and grant Crane standing was consistent with the
trend of expanding private rights of action to investors who suffered injury caused by fraudulent market activity. See cases cited note 3 supra.
On July 29, 1968, two months after the Crane litigation began, the Williams Act became
effective, adding the § 14(e) antifraud provision that does not contain the purchaser-seller
language of § 10(b) and rule lOb-5. See note 30 supra. The SEC had pressed for the passage of §
14(e) in that form to assure that all forms of fraudulent conduct in connection with tender offers
could be challenged by private litigants. See generally E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note
14, at 116-19. After the Williams Act became law, tender offerors based their claims on both §
14(e) and § 10(b). After CraneI the following cases held that the tender offeror had standing to
sue under the Williams Act: Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.
1974); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 430
U.S. 1 (1977); Applied Digital Data Sys. Inc. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,824 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Royal Indus., Inc. v. Monogram Indus.,
Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,863 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
35. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
36. See generally L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3617 (2d ed. Supp. 1969); Boone &
McGowan, Standing to Sue Under SECRule l0b-5, 49 TEx. L. REV. 617,620 (1971); Comment,
The Purchaser-SellerLimitation to SEC Rule lOb-5, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 684, 685 (1968).
Just prior to CraneI, in Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d
Cir. 1969), the Second Circuit had denied standing to a tender offeror suing the target corporation for fraudulent practices in opposing the tender offer because the tender offeror was not a
purchaser or seller under the Birnbaum rule.
37. 419 F.2d at 797.
38. Id. at 795-96.
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established proof of causation. 39 Under the court's analysis, Crane satisfied

the rule both because "[w]hen [it] entered the securities market with its
tender offer, it was entitled to the Act's protection not only against being
deceived itself but also against deception of the investing public designed to
prevent the public from entering into securities transactions, "40 and because
41
it had established that Standard's deception of the public caused it injury.
Crane's second cause of action was based on section 9(a)(2) 42 of the
Exchange Act, which prohibits transactions creating actual or apparent
active trading in a security. Standing to sue under that section is expressly
dependent upon plaintiff's status as a purchaser or seller. 43 The court
concluded that Crane's sale of stock on June 13, 1968, made it a seller under
the Act because the sale was the "intended and inevitable" result of
Standard's manipulation of the market. 44
The passage of eight years from Crane I to Crane I led to quite
different treatment of the case. The district court saw intervening Supreme

Court opinions as requiring reassessment of four issues explicitly or implicitly decided by Crane I: the existence of an implied private right of
39. Id. at 797-98.
40. Id. at 796.
41. Id. at 797. The court determined that Crane's evidence was sufficient to prove that:
Standard's extraordinary buying . . . coupled with its large secret sales off the
market, inevitably distorted the market picture and deceived public investors, particularly the Air Brake shareholders. The effect of these purchases was to create the
appearance of an extraordinary demand for Air Brake stock and a dramatic rise in
market price, as a result of which Air Brake shareholders were deterred from tendering to Crane.
Id. at 793.
42. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (1970).
43. See note 19 supra.
44. 419 F.2d at 794. The court reasoned that when Standard purchased shares on April 19,
it did so for the purpose of defeating Crane's tender offer and consummating the Standard
merger knowing full well that, if successful, Crane would be forced to sell its interest in Air
Brake because of antitrust considerations. The court likened Crane's situation to Vine's in Vine
v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967). Vine held shares
in Crown Company. Through deceptive practices Beneficial acquired 95% of Crown's shares
and then effected a short-form merger. This merger left Vine and other shareholders with only
the alternatives of selling the stock to Beneficial at an inadequate price or retaining their stock
in a nonexistent corporation. The court held that the disappearance of Crown had converted
Vine's stock into a claim for cash, id. at 634, and as a "forced seller" Vine was granted
standing to sue under rule lOb-5, id. at 635.
As a final note on the question of standing the CraneI court added that the passage of the
Williams Act "should serve to resolve any doubts about standing in the tender offer cases, even
where an offeror is not, as is Crane, in the position of a forced seller." 419 F.2d at 798-99. This
statement was clarified in a comment in the Second Circuit's next case involving a tender offer
contest, Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969),
the first case decided under the Williams Act. The court said: "The second prong of the
[Williams Act] is § 14(e). In effect this applies Rule lb-5 both to the offeror and to the
opposition-very likely, except perhaps for any bearing it may have on the issue of standing,
only a codification of existing case law." Id. at 940-41. For analysis of standing to sue under the
Williams Act after Chris-Craft, see Aranow, Einhorn & Berlstein, supra note 7.
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action under rule lOb-5 in favor of a tender offeror; a nonpurchaser's
standing to sue under rule lOb-5 and section 9(a)(2); the adequacy of
Crane's proof of causation; 45 and Crane's entitlement to relief. 46 With
regard to the standing issues, Crane HT! applied the reasoning of Piper
v. Chris-CraftIndustries, Inc. 47 concluding that a tender offeror is merely

an incidental beneficiary of the antifraud provisions of the Exchange
Act and as such cannot assert an implied private right of action for damages
under rule lOb-5, 48 and that because the gravamen of Crane's complaint was
the lost opportupity to control, rather than losses resulting from "an improper premium exacted for [Air Brake] stock," 49 it was not in the class of
investors protected by section 9 of the Exchange Act and therefore did not
50
have standing to sue under that section.
45. See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
46. See note 23 supra.
47. 430 U.S. 1 (1977), discussed at note 30 supra.
48. The Chris-CraftCourt had developed this position in part by reexamining J.I. Case
Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), the first case in which the Court had endorsed an implied
private right of action under a provision of the Exchange Act. The reasoning of Borak was that
private rights of action could be implied when they were shown to be a necessary supplement to
SEC enforcement to make effective the congressional purpose underlying the Exchange Act.
Id. at 432. According to the Chris-Craftreinterpretation, Borak held that an implied right of
action is never necessary unless it protects the interests of individuals for whose direct benefit a
provision of the Exchange Act is intended. See 430 U.S. at 25, 33, 41-42. The identity of those
individuals is to be determined by the language of the statute, id. at 24, and its legislative
history, id. at 25-26. In its examination of the Williams Act amendments to the Exchange Act,
under which Chris-Craftsought relief (in particular, § 14(e)), the Court determined that the sole
purpose of the Williams Act was the protection of public investors, see note 30 supra, and that
while tender offerors were regulated by the Williams Act, they were not its beneficiaries.
Applying this reasoning and extending it to a position that § 10(b) of the Exchange Act and rule
lOb-5 as well as the Williams Act were for the exclusive benefit of the "public investor," the
district court in Crane HI decided that the arguments against granting standing under § 14(e)
applied to Crane's claim of standing under § 10(b). 439 F. Supp. at 951-53.
Recognizing that Chris-Craftwas "not directly analogous" to Crane, id.at 951, because
Chris-Craft was concerned with claims under § 14(e) of the Williams Act and rule lOb-6
whereas Crane sued under rule lOb-5 and § 9(a)(2) of the Exchange Act, the court asked the
parties to submit memoranda analyzing the impact of Chris-Crafton Crane. In the memoranda:
Standard emphasized the similarity of the two cases, noting that Rule lOb-5 and §
9, relied upon by Crane here, were both among the bases for Chris-Craft's original
complaint. Standard assert[ed] that the legislative history of the 1934 Act evidences no
intent that these provisions would be applied to tender offers, or provide a private
cause of action for a defeated offeror. According to Standard, if a statute designed to
regulate tender offers-the Williams Act--does not give an offeror standing to sue for
damages, it would be anomalous to derive such a right of action from statutes directed
at other ends ...
Crane, naturally, [drew] quite a different lesson from Chris-Craft. That decision,
it . . .asserted, [did] not impair Crane's standing in this action; its holding [was] a
narrow one. The broad scope of the interests designed to be protected by the 1934 Act
[was] contrasted to the narrow aim of the Williams Act.
Further, Crane's trial posture as both a defeated tender offeror and a defrauded
seller [was] argued, with emphasis upon the CraneIholding that Crane had standing to
sue by virtue of its position as a forced seller.
Id. at 950-51.
49. 439 F. Supp. at 953.
50. The CraneIII court took note of the comments of the Supreme Court in Chris-Craft
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Of the other recent Supreme Court opinions pertinent to Crane, 5 t the
district court found Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,52 which
reaffirmed the Birnbaum rule, 53 especially relevant. It thought an anomaly
would result if Blue Chip, which would bar suits against Standard under
rule IOb-5 by those who did not tender their shares to Crane because of
Standard's market manipulation, would nevertheless permit Crane to recover for an injury substantially derivative of the nontendering shareholders. 5 4
The Crane II court also drew attention to a portion of the Blue Chip
opinion countenancing the Birnbaum rule's denial of standing to

" '[investors] related to an issuer who [were not purchasers or sellers but]

suffered loss in the value of their investment due to corporate or insider
with regard to Chris-Craft's claim for damages under rule lOb-6 (which included a discussion of
§ 9 of the Exchange Act under which Crane was suing):
Unlike Section 10(b), however, Section 9 provides an express cause of action for
persons injured by unlawful market activities. Yet, that cause of action is framed
specifically in favor of "any person who shall purchase or sell any security at a price
which was affected by such act or transaction .

. ."

Congress therefore focused in

Section 9 upon the amount actually paid by an investor for stock that had been the
subject of manipulative activity. This is not, as we have seen, the gravamen of ChrisCraft's complaint. It seeks no recovery for an improper premium exacted for Piper
stock; rather it desires compensation for its lost opportunity to control Piper. We
therefore conclude that, on its claimed basis for relief, Chris-Craft cannot avail itself
of Rule 10b-6.
Id. (quoting Chris-Craft, 430 U.S. at 46) (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied by CraneIII
court). The district court found the similarities between the two cases controlling. Id.
51. The court stated:
Chris-Craft does not stand alone, it is not sui generis, distinguishable from all
other cases because of unusual facts or esoteric points of law. Instead, it is one of
several recent Supreme Court decisions which indicate that the Court is taking a hard,
new look at federal jurisdiction under the securities laws. Included in this trend are
Santa Fe [Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977)] . . . ; TSC Industries, Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438. . . (1976); Ernst& Ernst v. Hochfelder,425 U.S. 185
• . . (1976); and Blue Chip Stamps v. ManorDrug Stores, 421 U.S. 723. . . (1975).
Id. at 953-54.
52. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
53. Id. at 755. For years standing under rule lOb-5 was limited by the rule in Birnbaum v.
Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952), that a person
who is merely misled into inaction-one who refrains from purchasing or selling because of
another's misstatements or omissions-cannot sue for damages. See text accompanying notes
35 & 36 supra. After the announcement of the rule a number of exceptions to it were
developed. See note 71 infra. The rule was severely criticized, see, e.g., A. JACOBS, TnE IMPACT
OF RULE IOB-5 § 38.01[d) (rev. ed. 1977), and one federal circuit rejected the rule, see Eason v.
General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960
(1974). In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, Blue Chip was required by an antitrust
consent decree to offer a substantial number of its shares to retailers who had used the stamp
service. In its offering to the retailers Blue Chip dissuaded some of the retailers from buying by
means of materially misleading statements containing an overly pessimistic appraisal of its
business so that the rejected shares could be offered to the public at a higher price. The
Supreme Court denied standing to the retailers, reaffirming the Birnbaum rule and declaring an
end to case-by-case erosion of the rule. The Court said there were policy advantages to the
Birnbaum rule-protection against vexatious litigation, indeterminate liability and difficult
problems of proof. 421 U.S. at 739-49.
54. 439 F. Supp. at 955.
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[trading]. .. which violate[d] Rule lOb-5' "I' in support of barring Crane
because "Crane itself [could] be compared to [this] class of potential
plaintiffs. "56 In the final portion of its opinion, using the fact that Blue Chip
expressed concern about the problems of proving causation and damages in
securities fraud cases as a springboard, the district court launched an attack
on Crane's proof of these elements.5 7 Crane had tried to show that Standard's market manipulation had caused its tender offer to fail, thus leading
to a failure in its take-over bid and a substantial diminution of the value of its
investment in Air Brake. 58 On the basis of the evidence presented, however,
the court held that even if Crane had standing it had not proved that it had
suffered any specific injury caused by Standard and therefore it was entitled
to no relief. 5 9
On each of the four issues decided in Crane111-existence of a private
right of action, standing to sue, causation and damages-the district court
could have decided for Crane, notwithstanding the recent Supreme Court
decisions. Chris-Craft's"narrow holding" that "a tender offeror, suing in
its capacity as a takeover bidder, does not have standing to sue [at law] for
damages under § 14(e)" 60 left open the question whether a tender offeror
could sue in equity for injunctive relief. 6 1 The Court's approval of Judge
Friendly's statement in Electronic Specialty Co. v.InternationalControls
55. Id. (quoting Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 738). Plaintiffs in Birnbaum were of this class.

Birnbaum involved a suit against the directors of Newport Steel Corporation, who, in their
official capacity, turned down a merger plan with Follansbee Steel Corporation. The president
then sold his controlling share of stock to Wilport Company at an above-market price. Plain-

tiffs, minority shareholders, sought recovery for the "control premium" the president exacted
from Wilport (plaintiffs would have shared in the value of the control premium if the merger

with Follansbee had been approved).
56. Id. at 955. Under the rationale of CraneI, Crane did not belong in this class because it
was the intended target of Standard's fraudulent activity and was forced to sell its shares

because of the activity. See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
57. 439 F. Supp. at 955.

58. See id. at 956-57. In support of its position Crane offered evidence that on April 19
there was an attractive spread between the value of the Crane offer and the market price of Air
Brake stock. In addition, it presented expert testimony that but for the sudden rise in price

caused by Standard's manipulation its offer would have succeeded. Id. Standard, on the other
hand, presented its own experts who testified that Crane's offer was not so attractive because

there was a possibility that shareholders tendering to Crane would face capital gains tax,
whereas, if the merger went through, shareholders could exchange their stock for Standard
stock, equal in value to the Crane offer, and not be taxed. Id. at 957.

On April 19, 1968, Standard must not have been convinced of this position; it took a half
million dollar trading loss on that day to defeat Crane's "unattractive" offer. Id. at 947.

59. Id. at 958.
60. 430 U.S. at 42 n.28.
61. "We intimate no view upon whether as a general proposition a suit in equity for

injunctive relief, as distinguished from an action for damages, would lie in favor of a tender
offeror under either § 14(e) or Rule lOb-6." Id. at 47 n.33. Aranow, Einhorn and Berlstein
express their belief that injunctive relief should be available to tender offerors. Aranow,
Einhorn & Berlstein, supra note 7, at 1760-61.
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Corp.6 2 that "in corporate control contests the stage of preliminary injunctive relief, rather than post-contest lawsuits, 'is the time when relief can
best be given' "63 would seem to indicate that a tender offeror does have
such a right. Crane began its suit by seeking preliminary injunctive relief but
was denied such relief by the district court. 64 In CraneI the court of appeals
ruled that this denial had been error and remanded the case to the district

court to grant such relief as might equitably be required, 65 including damages. 66 In so doing, as the court of appeals explained in CraneH, it did not

convert the suit from one in equity to an action at law for damages. 67 As on
remand the district court would have had the power to order divestiture, the
court of appeals had mentioned damages as an alternative, "less onerous
equitable remedy against Standard than what the district court had the
power to decree. '"68 If Chris-Craft left open a tender offeror's right to
seek preliminary injunctive relief, it arguably also left open an offeror's
(Crane's) right to appeal the wrongful denial of preliminary relief and the
69
right of a court subsequently to grant retrospective equitable relief.
62. 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969), discussed in note 44 supra.
63. 430 U.S. at 41-42 (quoting Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp.,
409 F.2d at 947).
64. See text accompanying notes 20-22 supra.
65. 419 F.2d at 804.
66. Id. at 803-04.
67. 490 F.2d at 342.
68. Id. at 340 (emphasis added). The court of appeals stated that the power to award
damages was within the district court's equitable "clean-up" jurisdiction. Id. Under the
"clean-up" doctrine a court of equity has authority to accord full relief in any case within its
cognizance even though giving such relief might mean redressing injuries for which there is
an adequate remedy at law. See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.7, at 83-84

(1973).
The Second Circuit compared the action it had taken to that taken in two prior cases
decided by the Supreme Court:
Mhe Borak Court approved a ruling. . . that, in a suit in equity to enjoin unlawful
proxy solicitation under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act with respect to a
merger since consummated, a district court "has jurisdiction under Section 27 to
award damages or such other retrospective relief to the plaintiff as the merits of the
controversy may require.".

.

. In Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co. .

.

. the Court

reaffirmed the right of a district court to award damages where a merger had been
consummated in the face of a pending equity suit alleging a misleading proxy solicitation.
490 F.2d at 340 (citations omitted) (quoting J.I. Case v. Borak, 317 F.2d 838, 849 (7th Cir. 1963),
aff'd, 377 U.S. 426 (1964)).
69. In Chris-Craft the Supreme Court took note that the court of appeals had given
injunctive relief. 430 U.S. at 47. The Court held that the injunction against Bangor Punta, one of
the tender offerors, should not have been granted, saying
Chris-Craft prior to the trial on liability expressly waived any claim to injunctive
relief. The case was tried

. . .

exclusively as a suit for damages. .

.

. Under these

circumstances, our holding that Chris-Craft does not have a cause of action for
damages under § 14(e) or Rule 10b-6 renders that injunction inappropriate, premised as
it was upon the permissible award of damages.
Id. Crane does not fall within the rationale of this holding. In Crane there was no express
waiver of injunctive relief. Crane II, 439 F. Supp. at 947. In dissent in Chris.Craft, Justice
Stevens argued that Chris-Craft's right to injunctive relief should not have been decided
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On the issue of standing, Blue Chip reaffirmed the Birnbaum rule,
putting an end to "case by case erosion of the rule.' '70 Apparently, however, Blue Chip did not affect the exceptions to the Birnbaum rule recognized at the time it was announced. 71 The most widely accepted exception to
the Birnbaum rule was the "forced seller" exception of Vine v. Beneficial
Finance Co.72 In Crane I the court of appeals granted standing to Crane
relying on this theory. 73 If Blue Chip did not affect the exceptions to the
Birnbaum rule, then it had no application to CraneLI. Accordingly, Crane
had a strong argument that it did indeed have standing under rule lOb-5.
On the issue of causation, the district court could have found for Crane
on the basis of Mills v. ElectricAuto-Lite Co. 74 and Affiliated Ute Citizens
v. United States. 75 Defendant in Mills successfully solicited proxies for a
merger using a proxy statement that failed to disclose material information.
Plaintiff was not required to prove that the solicitation would have failed but
for the nondisclosure; rather, the Supreme Court held it sufficient that
plaintiff had shown that the defective proxy solicitation was an "essential
link in the accomplishment of the transaction." 7 6 Affiliated Ute, also
dealing with a problem of causation in a nondisclosure case, held:
Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure
to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material in the
sense that a reasonable investor might have considered them imbecause it was not raised in the appeal briefs and the Court's action in setting aside the recovery

of damages "does not logically support the conclusion that there should be no remedy whatsoever for violations which the Court assumes, arguendo, were properly proved." 430 U.S. at

70 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
70. 421 U.S. at 755.
71. Five principal exceptions to the Birnbaum rule had developed prior to Blue Chip: the

injunctive relief exception, see, e.g., Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d
Cir. 1967); the forced seller exception, see, e.g., Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967), discussed in note 44 supra; the derivative action
exception, see, e.g., Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970); the aborted transaction
exception, see, e.g., Walling v. Beverly Enterprises, 476 F.2d 393 (9th Cir. 1973); and the de

facto seller exception, see, e.g., James v. Gerber Prods. Co., 483 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1973). Since
Blue Chip, several cases have granted standing to plaintiffs under these exceptions to the

Birnbaum rule. See, e.g., Horst v. W.T. Cabe & Co., [1977] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,213
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 1977) (aborted transaction); Singer v. Magnavox Co., [1976-1977 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)

[1976-1977 Transfer Binder]

95,830 (D. Del. 1977) (forced seller); Klamberg v. Roth,

FED. SEC.

L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,747 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (de facto

seller). Several commentators have also argued that the exceptions are generally still valid. See
Gallager, l0b-5 After Blue Chip Stamps: How Stands the Judicial Oak?, 80 DICK. L. REv. 1

(1975); 1976-1977 Securities Laws Developments, supra note 30, at 893-97; Note, Standing
Under Rule lOb-5 After Blue Chip Stamps, 75 MICH. L. REV. 413, 431-44 (1976).
72. 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967), discussed in note 44 supra.
73. See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
74. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).

75. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
76. 396 U.S. at 385.
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portant in the making of this decision. . . . This obligation to
disclose and this withholding of a7material fact establish the requisite element of causation in fact."
On the basis of these cases, the district court could have held either that
Standard's April 19 fraudulent stock transactions were an essential link in,
and therefore the cause of, the defeat of Crane's tender offer or that Standard
failed to disclose a material fact to Air Brake shareholders on April 19 and
therefore caused them not to tender their shares to Crane, thus resulting in
78
the defeat of Crane's tender offer.
Even if Crane failed to prove that Standard caused specific injury for
which the court could fashion a remedy it would not necessarily follow (as it
did implicitly in the court's opinion in CraneIll79) that Crane was entitled to
no relief. The Supreme Court anticipated that eventuality in Mills and said
that plaintiffs would still be entitled to attorneys' fees and reasonable
80
expenses to repay the cost of establishing the Exchange Act violation.
Crane could in equity have been granted this same minimal relief. 81
77. 406 U.S. at 153-54 (citations omitted).
78. This reasoning was advanced by Crane in Crane III. 439 F. Supp. at 956 n.4. The
district court replied that even though there may be a presumption of reliance when it is logical
to presume that reliance in fact existed, "[t]he proof submitted by Crane makes this Court
doubt that such a presumption is necessarily logical." Id. In addition, the court cited Justice
Blackmun's concurring opinion in Chris-Craft, 430 U.S. at 48, which had rejected the majority's position that a tender offeror lacked standing to sue under § 14(e) but had said that ChrisCraft should be denied relief because of insufficient proof of causation. The district court in
Crane III said its problem in finding causation was "akin to" Justice Blackmun's in ChrisCraft:
"It is not enough for the offeror to prove that the competitor's violations caused the
shareholders of the target corporation to act in a certain way. In addition, the offeror
must show that the shareholders' reactions to the misstatements or omissions caused
the injury for which it demands remuneration. Even though the Mills-Affiliated Ute
Citizens presumption satisfies the requirement for proof of the first element of
causation, the absence of any evidence that the violations might have altered the
outcome of the contest for control would leave me unable to hold that the securities
law violations caused the disappointed contestant's ultimate injury-its failure to
acquire control of the target corporation."
439 F. Supp. at 956 n.4 (quoting Chris-Craft, 430 U.S. at 51 (Blackmun, J., concurring)). But if
the presumption satisfies the requirement of proof that investors acted in a certain way, in
Crane that they failed to tender their shares, it would logically follow that this caused the tender
offer to fail.
79. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
80. 396 U.S. at 392-97.
81. The "American rule" governing the award of attorneys' fees in litigation in the federal
courts is that attorneys' fees "are not ordinarily recoverable in the absence of a statute or
enforceable contract providing therefor." Fleischman Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co.,
386 U.S. 714,717 (1967). There are two exceptions to this rule-attorneys' fees may be awarded
"where a successful litigant has conferred a substantial benefit on a class of persons and the
court's shifting of fees operates to spread the cost proportionately among the members of the
benefited class," F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116,
129-30 (1974), or "to a successful party when his opponent has acted in bad faith, vexatiously,
wantonly or for oppressive reasons," id. at 129. See also Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 257-59 (1975). Mills came under the first exception. The court
held that when plaintiffs established a violation of the proxy rules they restored fair and
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779

Despite the availability, and perhaps even the attraction, of these
alternative grounds for decision, it appears that the district court reached the
proper result in light of the present posture of the securities laws. The
arguments made for Crane's position are supportable, but they reflect policy
considerations and directions of another era of judicial decisionmaking. In
its recent opinions, the Supreme Court has not sought through technical
argumentation to stir the waters of securities fraud litigation, but rather has
sought through policy offensive to reverse the flow. To follow the leadership of the nation's highest tribunal, judges must not simply understand new
legal doctrines applicable to securities fraud litigation, they must learn a
new way of thinking about the role of the judiciary in handling the cases.
Judges were once admonished that the federal securities laws should be
interpreted " 'not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate
. . . [their broad] remedial purposes' ";82 by implication, the statutes are
now to be read narrowly 83 and judges are to guard against case by case
informed corporate suffrage, which was a substantial service to the corporation and its shareholders. To charge defendant corporation (all the shareholders) with attorneys' fees was "to
impose them on the class that ha[d] benefited from them." 396 U.S. at 396-97. Cranewould fall
under the second exception. Standard's bad faith stock transactions made it necessary for
Crane to undergo litigation to recover the value of its investment; in such circumstances the
burden of attorneys' fees should be shifted to Standard. The power of a court to award
attorneys' fees to a successful rule lOb-5 litigant under the bad faith exception was recognized
in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 210-1i n.30 (1976). The award of attorneys' fees
in Cranewould be further justified by the express provision of § 9(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1970),
allowing recovery of attorneys' fees by a party injured by a § 9(a)(2) violation.
82. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. at 151 (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963)). See also Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life &
Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
83. Of the recent "restrictive" opinions, three, Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462
(1977); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977); and Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185 (1976), turned on narrowing constructions of the language of the Exchange Act. In
Hochfelder the Supreme Court held that a private cause of action for damages would not lie
under § 10(b) and rule lob-5 in the absence of any allegation of "scienter," i.e., intent to
deceive, manipulate or defraud on the defendant's part. Id. at 199-214. The Court reached this
conclusion on the basis of the language of the statute saying that "[t]he use of the word
'manipulative' . . . is virtually a term of art," id. at 199, its reading of the legislative history,
id. at 201-06, its observation that in other sections in which Congress created express civil
liability for acts of negligence it had no trouble specifying its purpose, id. at 206-11, and its
determination that the administrative history of the Exchange Act indicated that when the SEC
adopted rule lOb-5 the rule was intended to apply to activities that involved scienter, id. at 21214.
Plaintiffs in Green challenged the fairness of the terms of a short-form merger. The
Supreme Court relegated plaintiffs to "whatever remedy is created by state law," 430 U.S. at
478, and said that the concern of rule lob-5 was full disclosure and that "once full . . .
disclosure has occurred, the fairness of the terms of the transaction is at most a tangential
concern of the statute," id. The Court added that "[a]bsent a clear indication of congressional
intent, we are reluctant to federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals
with transactions in securities, particularly where established state policies of corporate regulation would be overridden." Id. at 479.
Chris-Craft studied the legislative history of the Williams Act to determine the main
purpose of the statute and denied plaintiffs' right of action as not based upon that purpose. See
note 30 and accompanying text supra.
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erosion of established rules. s4 Once judges were encouraged to be "alert to
provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional
purposes";85 now judges are instructed to be on their guard against vexatious litigation 86 and the dangers of indeterminate liability.87 Once it was
proposed that the federal securities laws were a pervasive scheme of regulation intended to secure fair markets for all investors; it now appears judges

are to regard them as a limited, somewhat tentative effort88 to regulate the
89

securities markets for the benefit of public investors.
Many reservations have been expressed about this abrupt change of the
judicial mind. The sharpest and most telling criticism has come from within

the Supreme Court itself. Mr. Justice Blackmun, in dissent in Blue Chip,
argued that the majority had let certain policy considerations-namely,
guarding against vexatious litigation and avoiding difficult procedural issues-dominate its thinking and had evaded fundamental issues of substance.90 The salient issue in the case, said Blackmun, was the fact that
plaintiff had raised "disturbing claims of fraud.''91 The majority in rendering their decision, paid no heed to the unremedied wrong but rather
devoted their attention to worries about the possible motives of potential
84. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. at 755.
85. J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964).
86. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. at 739-49.
87. Id. at 739-41.
88. In the majority opinion in Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,477-80 (1977), it was
argued that rule lOb-5 is only concerned with disclosure and that once there is disclosure federal
courts should have no concern for fairness. This holding emasculates subsections (a) and (c) of
rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5(a), (c) (1977), which prohibit any device, scheme, or artifice
to defraud, or conduct that operates as a fraud or deceit upon, any person in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security. The Court feared, however, that if the federal judiciary got
into questions of fairness
[t]he result would be to bring within the Rule a wide variety of corporate conduct
traditionally left to state regulation. . . .Federal courts applying a "federal fiduciary
principle" under Rule lOb-5 could be expected to depart from state fiduciary standards
at least to the extent necessary to ensure uniformity within the federal system.
430 U.S. at 478-79. The Court added: "There may well be a need for uniform federal fudiciary
standards to govern mergers such as that challenged in this complaint. But those standards
should not be supplied by judicial extension of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 'to cover the corporate
universe.' " Id. at 479-80 (quoting Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 633, 700 (1974), which expressed concern about the low standards for
corporate conduct in the Delaware corporation law; it is ironic that his article was quoted in
support of lower standards under federal law).
The majority opinion in Green countered the view expressed by various commentators that
decisions under the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act constituted a body of substantive
federal corporate law. See, e.g., Jacobs, The Role of the SecuritiesExchange Act Rule lOb-5 in
the Regulation of CorporateMismanagement, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 27 (1973); Painter, Inside
Information: Growing Painsfor the Development of FederalCorporateLaw under Rule lOb-5,
65 COLUM. L. REV. 1361 (1965).

89. See generally Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. at 30-40.
90. 421 U.S. at 761-71 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 762 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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plaintiffs 92 and the problem that proof of causation might depend on "oral
testimony." 93 He concluded:
The facts of this case, if proved and accepted by the factfinder,
surely are within the conduct that Congress intended to ban.
Whether this particular plaintiff . . . will be able to carry the

burdens of proving fraud and of proving reliance and damage...
is a matter that should not be left to speculations of "policy" of the
kind now advanced in this forum so far removed from witnesses
and evidence.
I am uneasy about the type of precedent the present
decision establishes. Policy considerations can be applied and
utilized in like fashion in other situations. The acceptance of this
decisional route in this case may well come back to haunt us. . . I
would decide the case to fulfill the broad purpose that the language
of the statutes and the legislative history dictate. .... 94
Mr. Justice Stevens, in dissent in Chris-Craft, criticized the majority for
focusing on the narrow intent of ensuring enforcement of the securities laws
to protect the "public investor" and being oblivious to the fact that this
could only be accomplished by ensuring enforcement of the laws on behalf
95
of all investors who had an interest in the integrity of the securities market.
Stevens forcefully argued that in Chris-Craft the majority had excluded
from the class of plaintiffs those most interested in and96most capable of
ensuring effective enforcement-the tender offeror itself.
92. Certainly, this Court must be aware of the realities of life, but it is unwarranted
for the Court to take a form of attenuated judicial notice of the motivations that
defense counsel may have in settling a case, or of the difficulties that a plaintiff may
have in proving his claim.
Id. at 770 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
93. [Ihe greater portion of the Court's opinion is devoted to its discussion of the
"danger of vexatiousness". . . that accompanies litigation under Rule lob-5 and that
is said to be "different in degree and in kind from that which accompanies litigation in
general." It speaks of harm from the "very pendency of the lawsuit,". . . something
like the recognized dilemma of the physician sued for malpractice; of the "disruption
of normal business activities which may accompany a lawsuit" . . . and of "proof
. . . which depend[s] almost entirely on oral testimony," . . . as if all these were
unknown to lawsuits taking place in America's courthouses every day. In turning to
and being influenced by these "policy considerations," . . . the Court, in my view,
unfortunately mires itself in speculation and conjecture not usually seen in its opinions. In order to support an interpretation that obviously narrows a provision of the
securities laws designed to be a "catch-all," the Court takes alarm at the "practical
difficulties," . . . that would follow the removal of Birnbaum'sbarrier.
Id. at 769-70 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 770-71 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
95. [Pjrotection of tender offerors is not only consistent with protection of shareholders. It is also indispensable to protecting shareholders. Individual shareholders often
lack the capacity to litigate these cases effectively. Few indeed could afford to pursue
the course Chris-Craft has taken of hiring counsel with experience in complex litigation of this kind to litigate through a preliminary injunction, discovery, trial on
liability, another trial on damages, three appeals to the Second Circuit, including an en
banc, and three petitions to this Court. Thus, the most realistic deterrent to fraud on
shareholders is a damage suit brought by the opposition in the tender contest.
430 U.S. at 68 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
96. If a private remedy must be applied to ensure full compliance with the statute, the
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The criticisms of Justices Blackmun and Stevens can be applied to
Crane. The factual situation presented to the district court was that on April
19 Standard willfully perpetrated a fraud on the shareholders of Air Brake
for the purpose of defeating Crane's tender offer. The substantive question
raised by the facts was whether, under either section 9(a)(2) or rule lOb-5,
Crane was entitled to the protection of the Exchange Act and could,
therefore, sue to recover for the injury it suffered as a result of the fraud. To
deny that Crane had such a right on substantive grounds the CraneHI court
would have had to refute the holding of Crane I that Crane was "entitled to
the Act's protection not only against being deceived itself, but also against
the deception of the investing public designed to prevent the public from
entering into securities transactions." 97 But Crane.I finessed the substantive issue by invoking the standing requirement of the Birnbaum rule. It is
doubly ironic that Blue Chip, which had resurrected the Birnbaum rule to
guard against vexatious litigation and then had applied the rule in a suit
bearing none of the indicia of vexatious litigation, would be applied in
Crane, a suit similarly devoid of such indicia. Crane DI also avoided the
substantive issue by relying on the stare decisis effect of Chris-Craft even
though Chris-Craft involved different sections of the Exchange Act. In
applying Chris-Craftto Crane the Crane LIT court did not seriously question whether tender offerors were excluded from the protection of section
10(b) as they were from the narrower section 14(e) as interpreted by the
majority in Chris-Craft.As a result, Crane11I was able to achieve the same
result as Chris-Craft-denyingstanding to the party most interested in and
capable of enforcing the Exchange Act and permitting the defendant to
achieve control of a corporation by the use of fraudulent means expressly
proscribed by that Act. In the last portion of the district court's opinion,
concerning proof of causation, Crane was ostensibly assumed to have
standing to sue. But even there the substantive issue was not faced squarely
because Crane was only granted second-class standing: it did not have the
benefit of the presumption of causation to which, as plaintiff in a nondisclo98
sure case, it would normally be entitled.
The result in Crane and the results it presages are unsettling. The new
rules permit violators of securities laws to escape liability and deny relief to
their innocent victims. By so favoring defendants the Supreme Court has not
remedy must be available to the litigants who are most vitally interested in effective
enforcement. . . . Once one recognizes that Congress intended to rely heavily on
private litigation as a method of implementing the statute, it seems equally clear that
Congress would not exclude the persons most interested in effective enforcement
from the class authorized to enforce the new law.
Id. at 61-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
97. 419 F.2d at 797.
98. See note 78 and text accompanying notes 74-78 supra.
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restored equilibrium in the administration of justice. It has only, as demonstrated in Crane IT, restricted the ability of the federal judiciary to deal with
substantive issues of fraud. The recent decisions may have the effect of
exposing the limitations of the existing securities laws and expediting the
adoption of more comprehensive federal legislation, 99 but the movement to
develop new federal legislation should not delay the effort to restore in
judicial interpretation of the Exchange Act primary concern both for dealing
with substantive issues of fraud and for fulfillment of the Act's broad
remedial purposes. 100
HERMAN FORTESCUE GREENE
99. For commentary on proposed federal corporate law, see Cary, supra note 88, at 70105; Loss, The American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code Project, 25 Bus. LAW. 27
(1969); Schwartz, An Introduction to Symposium, FederalCharteringof Corporations,61 GEO.

L.J. 71 (1972).
100. Crane III is currently on appeal to the Second Circuit. Telephone conversation with
Mr. Peter J. McKenna, attorney for plaintiff, New York, New York (Jan. 31, 1978).
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